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Consider the following problem: at each date in the future, a given event may or may not
occur, and you will be asked to forecast, at each date, the probability that the event will
occur in the next date. Unless you make degenerate forecasts (zero or one), the fact that
the event does or does not occur does not prove your forecast wrong. But, in the long run,
if your forecasts are accurate, the conditional relative frequencies of occurrence of the event
should approach your forecast.
Foster and Vohra (1998) presented an algorithm that, whatever the sequence of realiza-
tions of the event, will meet the long-run accuracy criterion, even though it is completely
ignorant about the real probabilities of occurrence of the event, or about the reasons why
the event occurs or fails to occur. It is an adaptive algorithm, that reacts to the history of
forecasts and occurrences, but does not learn from the history anything about the future:
indeed, the past need not say anything about the future realizations of the event. The algo-
rithm only looks at its own past inaccuracies and tries to make up for them in the future.
The amazing result is that this (making up for past inaccuracies) can be done with arbitrarily
high probability.
Alternative arguments for this result have been proposed in the literature. A remarkable
one is given by Foster (1999), where a very simple algorithm has been proved to work, using a
classical result in game theory, the Approachability Theorem, proposed by Blackwell (1956).
Blackwell’s theorem gives sufficient conditions under which the average rewards of a player
who learns from past plays can approach any closed a convex set, in a vector-valued repeated
game. Recently, Greenwald et Al (2006) has specialized Blackwell’s Theorem for the case
where the set to be approached is the non-negative orthant of the payoff space, and has
shown that a weaker condition than Blackwell’s suffices in that case. It turns out that the
case considered by Greenwald et Al is precisely the setting needed for Foster’s argument, so,
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in that sense, it provides a simplification of Foster’s proof. In this note I present such an
argument.
Incidentally, in this note I modify Foster’s algorithm, to correct what seems to be a
typographical error. Also, for the sake of clarity, I present the argument in all detail.
1. The Setting
At each future date t, an event may occur (xt = 1) or not (xt = 0). For each date t, a forecast
is a number pt representing the probability that, one suggests, the event will occur at t. The
forecast for date t is made after observing the history of realizations of the event up to the
previous period, (xs)
t−1
s=1. Let us assume that only a subset of forecasts are acceptable: fix
a positive integer M , and, for each m ≤ M , define the interval I(m) = [m−1
M
, m
M
] and the
point p(m) = 2m−1
2M
;1 it is assumed that the forecast that can be made is restricted to be an
element of the set {p(1), . . . , p(M)}.2
For simplicity, denote X = (Xt)
∞
t=1, M = {1, . . . ,M}, and, for each positive integer T ,
denote by HT the set of all possible histories of forecasts and realizations up to date T ,
namely Ht = (M× {0, 1})T ; the generic history in that set is denoted by h = (mt, xt)Tt=1,
where mt represents the forecast made for t. For definiteness, also adopt the convention that
H0 = {(1, 0)}.
2. Forecast Deficit and Excess
Given a history h of length T , define, for each possible forecast m in M, the following
numbers:
(i) The (observed) empirical frequency, conditional on m having been the forecast:
ρmT (h) =
∑T
t=1 xtI(mt = m)∑T
t=1 I(mt = m)
,
whenever the denominator of the expression is positive;3 The denominator is zero if the
forecast m has not been made along history h; in this case, simply let ρmT (h) = p(m).
(ii) The weighted deficit on the empirical conditional frequency relative to the lower bound
of the forecast:
dmT (h) = (
m− 1
M
− ρmT (h))
T∑
t=1
I(mt = m)
T
.
(iii) The weighted excess on the empirical conditional frequency relative to the upper bound
of the forecast:
emT (h) = (ρ
m
T (h)−
m
M
)
T∑
t=1
I(mt = m)
T
.
It is immediate that ρmT (h) ∈ I(m) if, and only if, dmT (h) ≤ 0 and emT (h) ≤ 0. Also,
notice that dmT (h) ≥ 0 implies emT (h) < 0, and emT (h) ≥ 0 implies dmT (h) < 0. Another useful
property of these numbers is given by the following Lemma.
1 Notice that ∪Mm=1I(M) = [0, 1] and that p(m) is the middle point of I(m).
2 Since p defines a one-to-one correspondence, I will refer to m also as the forecast p(m).
3 Here, I denotes the standard indicator function.
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Lemma 1 (Foster). If ρmT (h) /∈ I(m) for every forecast m ∈ M, then there exists some
forecast m ∈M such that dmT (h) > 0 and em−1T (h) > 0.
Proof: By assumption, for all m ∈ M, either dmT (h) > 0 or emT (h) > 0. By construction,
d1T (h) ≤ 0 and eMT (h) ≤ 0, so e1T (h) > 0 and dMT (h) > 0. If d2T (h) > 0, we are done.
Otherwise, it must be that d2T (h) ≤ 0 and, hence e2T (h) > 0, and we can follow the search.
The result follows since M is finite: at the latest, dM−1T (h) ≤ 0, so eM−1T (h) > 0, which
suffices since dMT (h) > 0. Q.E.D.
3. Randomized Forecasts and Calibration
Let ∆ denote the set of probability distributions over the set of forecastsM.4 A forecasting
rule is a sequence L = (Lt : HT−1 → ∆)∞t=1. That is, for a date t and given a history h ∈ Ht−1,
the forecasting rule L gives a probability distribution Lt(h) over M; the interpretation is
that, when forecasting for that date and after that history, forecast m is going to be chosen
with probability Lt(h)(m).
Given a forecast L and a sequence X = (xt)∞t=1 ∈ {0, 1}∞, let PL,X denote the probability
measure induced on M∞.5 In the long-run, a sequence of good forecasts should have the
property that, if p(m) has been forecast infinitely many times, then the relative frequency
of occurrence conditional on p(m) having been forecast should approach p(m), and, in par-
ticular, should lie in I(m). We capture this property as follows. First, for a history h of
length T , define the aggregate mistake made by the forecasts by aggregating the deficits and
surpluses whenever they are positive, by letting
CT (h) =
M∑
m=1
(dmT (h)
+ + emT (h)
+);
a forecasting rule L is calibrated if for every  > 0, there exists a date T such that, for any
sequence of events X,
PL,X({h ∈M∞ : CT ((mt, xt)Tt=1) ≥  for some T ≥ T}) < .
Note that no structure is imposed on how the sequence X = (xt)
∞
t=1 is determined, with
the only exception that it is assumed that xt cannot be determined as a function of mt,
because the choice of the forecast is allowed to be made randomly.
4 Namely, ∆ is the unit simplex in RM .
5 Let S be the algebra of finite collections of finite histories, and define the outer measure P∗ : S → [0, 1]
by
P∗({{1} × {(mst )Tst=1} ×M∞}Ss=1) =
S∑
s=1
(L1((1))(ms1)
Ts∏
t=2
Lt((msq, xq)
t−1
q=1)(m
s
t )).
Then, construct the probability space ({1} ×M∞,Σ,PL,X), using Carathe´odory’s extension procedure: Σ
is the set of P∗-measurable subsets of {1} ×M∞ and PL,X is the restriction to Σ of the extension of P∗ as
P∗(S) = inf{
∞∑
n=1
P∗(Sn) : {Sn}∞n=1 ⊆ S and S ⊆ ∪∞n=1Sn}.
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4. A Calibrated Forecasting Rule
The following forecasting rule is a very minor modification of the one presented by Foster
(1999): define L¯ as follows: for a date T , given a previous history h ∈ HT−1,
(1) if there exists m¯ ∈M such that ρm¯T−1(h) ∈ I(m¯), then let LT (h)(m¯) = 1 and LT (h)(m) =
0 for every other m;
(2) otherwise, find m¯ ∈M such that dm¯T−1(h) > 0 and em¯−1T−1 (h) > 0, and let6
LT (h)(m¯) =
em¯−1T−1 (h)
dm¯T−1(h) + e
m¯−1
T−1 (h)
and LT (h)(m¯− 1) = d
m¯
T−1(h)
dm¯T−1(h) + e
m¯−1
T−1 (h)
,
while LT (h)(m) = 0 for every other m.
It follows from Lemma 1 that forecasting rule L¯ is well defined. It is different from the
one presented by Foster (1999) in that, in case (2), for the same m¯, it randomizes between
m¯ and m¯ − 1, with probabilities proportional to em¯−1T−1 (h) and dm¯T−1(h), respectively, while
the forecasting rule of Foster (1999) randomizes between m¯ and m¯ + 1 with probabilities
proportional to dm¯T−1(h) and e
m¯−1
T−1 (h), respectively; while this difference is subtle, it is not, I
think, trivial.
Theorem (Foster and Vohra). L¯ is calibrated
The proof of this result given by Foster (1999) represents the problem as an infinitely-
repeated game played between the forecaster and Nature (who chooses the realizations of
the event). In this representation, Blackwell’s Approachability Theorem is used to show that
the forecaster can force his average payoff to approach any closed and convex set, and in
particular the non-negative orthant, which is equivalent to calibration, as we will see below.
The result in Greenwald et Al (2006) specializes Blackwell’s Theorem for the specific case
needed here: it gives a sufficient condition under which the forecaster’s average payoff will
approximate the non-negative orthant.
Before giving the argument, recall the definition of a a vector-valued game given by
Blackwell (1956): it is a 4-tuple Γ = (A,A′, V, γ) consisting of: (i) the set of actions of a
player, A, which is assumed to be finite; (ii) the set of actions of the opponent(s), A′; (iii)
a vector space over R, set V , endowed with an inner product; and (iv) an outcome function
γ : A× A′ → V .
Now, consider the infinite, sequential repetition of the vector-valued game defined by
A = M, A′ = {0, 1}, V = R2M , and, as in Foster (1999), γ defined as follows: for each
component l ∈ {1, . . . , 2M},
γl(m,x) =

m−1
M
− x, if m = l;
x− m
M
, if m = l −M ;
0, otherwise.
It is obvious that γ is bounded.
6 The following expression corrects a typo that appeared in the published version of this paper.
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For a horizon T and a history h of length T, it is immediate that if
∑T
t=1 I(mt = l) = 0,
namely if forecast l ∈ {1, . . . ,M} has not been made along history h, then∑Tt=1 γl(mt, xt) =
0. Importantly, when forecast l has been made, so that
∑T
t=1 I(mt = l) 6= 0, by construction
we have that
T∑
t=1
γl(mt, xt) =
T∑
t=1
I(mt = l)(
l − 1
M
)−
T∑
t=1
xtI(mt = l) = d
l
T (h)T.
We can apply a similar argument for the excess functions, to get that for every l ∈ {M +
1, . . . , 2M}, if ∑Tt=1 I(mt = l − M) = 0 then ∑Tt=1 γl(mt, xt) = 0, while if ∑Tt=1 I(mt =
l −M) 6= 0 then ∑Tt=1 γl(mt, xt) = elT (h)T . With these results, the following Lemma will
yield the Theorem.
Lemma 2. For every date T , every history h ∈ HT−1 and every realization x ∈ {0, 1},
(
T−1∑
t=1
γ(mt, xt))
+ ·
M∑
m=1
LT (h)(m)γ(m,x) ≤ 0. (1)
Proof: Consider two cases:
Case 1: there exists some forecast m ∈ M such that ρmT−1(h) ∈ I(m). By construction,
for some forecast m¯ ∈ M such that ρm¯T−1(h) ∈ I(m¯), we have that LT (h)(m¯) = 1 and
LT (h)(m) = 0 for every other m. Immediately, the left-hand side of expression (1) becomes
simply
(
T−1∑
t=1
γm¯(mt, xt))
+LT (h)(m¯)γm¯(m¯, x) + (
T−1∑
t=1
γm¯+M(mt, xt))
+LT (h)(m¯)γm¯+M(m¯, x).
If
∑T−1
t=1 I(mt = m¯) = 0, then
∑T−1
t=1 γm¯(mt, xt) = 0 and
∑T−1
t=1 γm¯+M(mt, xt) = 0, so the
result is obvious. Else,
∑T−1
t=1 γm¯(mt, xt) = d
m¯
T−1(h)(T − 1) and
∑T−1
t=1 γm¯+M(mt, xt) =
em¯T−1(h)(T −1), which implies that (
∑T−1
t=1 γm¯(mt, xt))
+ = 0 and (
∑T−1
t=1 γm¯+M(mt, xt))
+ = 0,
since ρm¯T−1(h) ∈ I(m¯) implies that dm¯T−1(h) ≤ 0 and em¯T−1(h) ≤ 0.
Case 2: for every forecast m ∈ M, ρmT−1(h) /∈ I(m). Again by construction, there exists
some m¯ ∈M such that dm¯T−1(h) > 0, em¯−1T−1 (h) > 0,
LT (h)(m¯) =
em¯−1T−1 (h)
dm¯T−1(h) + e
m¯−1
T−1 (h)
and LT (h)(m¯− 1) = d
m¯
T−1(h)
dm¯T−1(h) + e
m¯−1
T−1 (h)
,
while LT (h)(m) = 0 for every other m. The left-hand side of (1) now equals the sum of the
four following terms:
(
T−1∑
t=1
γm¯(mt, xt))
+LT (h)(m¯)γm¯(m¯, x),
(
T−1∑
t=1
γm¯−1(mt, xt))+LT (h)(m¯− 1)γm¯−1(m¯− 1, x),
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(
T−1∑
t=1
γm¯+M(mt, xt))
+LT (h)(m¯)γm¯+M(m¯, x),
and
(
T−1∑
t=1
γm¯+M−1(mt, xt))+LT (h)(m¯− 1)γm¯+M−1(m¯− 1, x).
Since , dm¯T−1(h) > 0 and e
m¯−1
T−1 (h) > 0, it follows that
∑T−1
t=1 I(mt = m¯−1) 6= 0,
∑T−1
t=1 I(mt =
m¯)(h) 6= 0, em¯T−1(h) < 0, and dm¯−1T−1 (h) < 0. This implies that
T−1∑
t=1
γm¯(mt, xt) = d
m¯
T−1(h)(T − 1) ≥ 0 and
T−1∑
t=1
γm¯−1(mt, xt) = dm¯−1T−1 (h)(T − 1) ≤ 0,
while
T−1∑
t=1
γm¯+M(mt, xt) = e
m¯
T−1(h)(T − 1) ≤ 0 and
T−1∑
t=1
γm¯+M−1(mt, xt) = em¯−1T−1 (h)(T − 1) ≥ 0.
It follows that the left-hand side of equation (1) is simply
dm¯T−1(h)
em¯−1T−1 (h)
dm¯T−1(h) + e
m¯−1
T−1 (h)
(
m¯− 1
M
−x)(T−1)+em¯−1T−1 (h)
dm¯T−1(h)
dm¯T−1(h) + e
m¯−1
T−1 (h)
(x−m¯− 1
M
)(T−1),
which is 0 by direct computation. Q.E.D.
Now, to prove the Theorem, it suffices to observe that, from Lemma 2 and Theorem 5
in Greenwald et Al (2006), we have that for every  > 0, there exists T ∈ N such that, for
every X ∈ {0, 1}∞,
PL¯,X({h ∈M∞ : ∃T ≥ T :
2M∑
m=1
(
T∑
t=1
γm(mt, xt)
T
)+ ≥ ) < .
This suffices, since, once again,
2M∑
m=1
(
T∑
t=1
γm(mt, xt)
T
)+ =
M∑
m=1
(dmT ((mt, xt)
T
t=1))
+ +
M∑
m=1
(emT ((mt, xt)
T
t=1))
+.
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